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The Association of European 
Microstates with the EU 
Integration Test with Model Value 
Nicola Forster / Felix Mallin 
The European microstates Andorra, Monaco, and San Marino have only been partially 
integrated into the European single market. Consequently, there are several regulatory 
gaps in areas such as financial markets, the free movement of workers, as well as with-
in the Schengen Agreement. Moreover, the smooth adaptation of Community acquis is 
being hampered. In December 2013, the European Council called for the negotiation 
of a framework Association Agreement with the three countries. For Brussels, the rap-
prochement of these countries might also serve as a test run for dealing with other 
European countries whose full membership is rejected either by the EU or by the state 
concerned. 
 
Due to their limited internal markets and 
foreign political capacities, the European 
microstates rely on smooth foreign policy 
cooperation with the EU. For a long time, 
they smartly agreed to attach themselves 
to the EU via bilateral treaties with their 
direct neighbours. Hence, the microstates 
adopted the euro as their common cur-
rency, while San Marino and Andorra are 
also part of the EU Customs Union. As a 
consequence of ever-deepening European 
integration, the microstates have had to 
call upon the EU more frequently instead 
of their direct neighbours – France, Spain, 
and Italy. For a few years, Andorra, Monaco, 
and San Marino (here: AMS countries) have 
been endeavouring to redefine their hither-
to fragmentary and incoherent relations 
with the EU. Their goal is to make better 
use of the potential that the single market 
offers. They also hope to increase legal cer-
tainty and achieve greater independence 
from their neighbours. Because of their 
comparative political insignificance, they 
have hardly been able to stimulate much 
political interest on the part of the Member 
States. Although, in principle, most Mem-
ber States support a continuing rapproche-
ment, effective political and economic 
interest is limited to the respective neigh-
bours of the AMS countries. 
Conformity of the EU legal realm 
Brussels is interested in deeper institution-
al integration in order to close regulatory 
gaps in the midst of Europe and to ensure 
the uncomplicated comprehension of Com-
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 munity acquis. If Switzerland, the micro-
states, and the special territories are not 
progressively integrated, these entities will 
persist as regulation exclaves that block the 
EU’s efforts at conformity and coherence. 
For a long time, this was the case in fi-
nance and tax regulation affairs, until the 
microstates sought to dissociate themselves 
from their stigmatisation as tax havens. In 
the meantime, all AMS countries have been 
crossed off the OECD’s list of uncooperative 
tax havens and are currently negotiating 
an anti-fraud agreement with the EU. Still, 
Andorra, for instance, has not yet intro-
duced an income tax or an inheritance tax. 
Also the free movement of workers is 
almost exclusively dealt with through bi-
lateral arrangements with the respective 
neighbours. San Marino, for instance, has 
concluded a free movement agreement 
only with Italy, as a result of which the fle-
xibility of workers and enterprises in San 
Marino is significantly limited. Especially 
since the beginning of the economic crisis 
in Italy, this represents a major challenge 
for the volatile economy of the small 
country. 
Strengthening of sovereignty 
The foreign ministries and diplomatic rep-
resentations of the microstates only have a 
few dozen diplomats at their disposal – too 
few to cope with the increased exigencies 
of foreign policy. 
The focus, thus, is directed on the diplo-
matic representations to the EU, the United 
Nations, and the neighbouring countries. 
To be able to manage the administrative 
requirements of common legislation with 
the EU, the microstates have streamlined 
their politics towards Europe. EU legisla-
tion is absorbed with immediate effect. EU 
regulations are only introduced if absolute-
ly imperative. Andorra, for instance, which 
for a long time had no direct aviation con-
nections to Europe, saw itself obliged to 
introduce the European Aviation Regula-
tory Framework in order to build a heli-
port. 
The implementation of foreign policy 
can easily create dilemmas for the micro-
states as they pursue their own interests 
while also taking the interests of their 
powerful neighbours into consideration. 
While San Marino – the world’s oldest re-
public – enjoyed comparatively unrestrict-
ed decision-making in the past, the co-prin-
cipality of Andorra has repeatedly been 
exposed to restrictive stipulations by Paris, 
Madrid, and – due to the constitutional role 
of the Bishop of Urgel – sometimes also the 
Vatican. Hence, the decision over the recog-
nition of Kosovo became a diplomatic bal-
ancing act for Andorra, which was entrap-
ped between the conflicting positions of 
Spain and France. Despite pressure from 
Madrid, in the end a decision was taken to 
favour recognition. Similarly, the debate 
about the possible independence of Cata-
lonia has the potential to set off a fuse in 
Catalan Andorra. The government, how-
ever, has a strong interest in not sacrific-
ing its good relations with Madrid. 
Since the French president, as acting co-
prince of Andorra, occupies an exceptional 
position – and because of the political en-
tanglement with Monaco – France, as a 
protecting power, is able to directly exert 
political co-determination in two countries. 
Monaco, on the other hand, which is the 
smallest of the AMS states by far, is the least 
independent with regard to foreign policy. 
Deeper European integration would there-
fore also increase its sovereignty vis-à-vis 
France and, as such, provide more legal cer-
tainties and political calculability. With the 
perspective of integrating the AMS coun-
tries more thoroughly, the special status of 
France may, in the long term, prove to be 
unsustainable. 
Liechtenstein as a model 
It is hardly surprising that, for inspiration 
in their own endeavours, the AMS countries 
are turning to Liechtenstein, which has 
achieved an advantageous position in Eu-
rope in terms of conducting its own foreign 
policy. The principality, which is interna-
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 tionally acknowledged as the prime exam-
ple of a successful microstate, was able to 
strengthen its sovereignty vis-à-vis Switzer-
land through its membership in the Euro-
pean Economic Area (EEA). Since EEA legis-
lation is directly adopted as state law, there 
are no legal uncertainties. As a geopoliti-
cally irrelevant microstate – and therefore 
strongly dependent on the protection pro-
vided by international law – Liechtenstein 
has earned itself a reputation in multilat-
eral organs as being an advocate for the 
consolidation of international law. Liech-
tenstein’s diplomats and legal experts have 
demonstrated their commitment to the 
EEA. Hence, the small country was able to 
overcome prejudices against the insuffi-
cient institutional capacities of a micro-
state with regard to constructive participa-
tion in multilateral organs. Liechtenstein 
was also able to secure a special provision 
for the free movement of persons. Citizens 
of the country enjoy full freedom of move-
ment within the EU, whereas quotas re-
main in place for EU citizens. This dero-
gation exemplifies the ability of the EU to 
take the specific circumstances of micro-
states into consideration, if necessary. 
Status of negotiations with the EU 
When the relationship of the EU with the 
members of the European Free Trade Asso-
ciation (EFTA) came under scrutiny for the 
first time during the rotating EU Presidency 
of France in 2008, the question about the 
relationship with the remaining Western 
European states – the AMS countries – was 
also raised. In 2011 open-ended consulta-
tions were initiated, with the goal of work-
ing towards closer cooperation with the 
three states. Originally, it was not only the 
Association Agreement currently being 
debated, but also EEA and even EU mem-
bership under consideration. Both latter 
options have since been put on the back 
burner, as Brussels doubts the AMS states’ 
abilities to fulfil all obligations tied to 
membership. 
The belief is that the administrative ca-
pacities of the microstates are insufficient 
to absorb new Union legislation. Further-
more, the complex decision-making mecha-
nisms of the EU are not designed for such 
small states. With regard to potential EEA 
accession, it is especially Norway that is 
opposed to the idea. The official reason 
given is to avoid any complications in the 
EEA’s internal decision-making. However, 
Norway may also be interested in obviating 
a shift of influence towards a microstate 
alliance. 
This stonewalling attitude is incompre-
hensible for the AMS countries, which point 
out that neither the EU (with the accession 
of Malta) nor the EEA (with Liechtenstein) 
have seen any subsequent lack in opera-
tional capabilities. 
The signals sent by the AMS states also 
vary, depending on the different integra-
tion options in question. Current political 
ambitions and existing integration regimes 
vary widely amongst all three. Andorra is 
showing the strongest political will to fur-
ther its integration and seems to be in-
creasingly modelling itself on Liechten-
stein. Thus, it is not unlikely that Andorra 
will attempt to accede to the EFTA and, in 
the medium term, also the EEA. For that 
purpose, however, Andorra would need 
to be able to demonstrate corresponding 
administrative capacities and be able to 
contribute financially to the EFTA Secre-
tariat. 
San Marino is also interested in further-
ing its integration: A referendum held in 
September 2013 resulted in a narrow ma-
jority opting for the submission of a formal 
accession request to the EU. However, the 
necessary quorum was missed. Therefore, 
the EU membership objective has now 
given way to the elaboration of an Asso-
ciation Agreement with the EU. 
Monaco, on the other hand, is seeking to 
facilitate certain trade activities. Contrary 
to Andorra and San Marino, the country 
participates in the Customs Union only 
through an indirect treaty via Paris and is 
aspiring to direct single-market access. 
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 Monaco has no democratically legitimised 
parliament and, hence, does not fulfil one 
of the necessary accession requirements. 
Moreover, the country would not be willing 
to accept all four freedoms of the EU in 
their entirety: Owing to its small internal 
labour market, the country fears in parti-
cular the introduction of the freedom of 
establishments and services. France, which 
does not want to relinquish its dominant 
position in the triangular Monaco-Paris-
Brussels relationship, is keen for Monaco 
to achieve a special status, or even a tri-
lateral agreement. For that reason, the 
official wording in the Commission docu-
ments reads “one or several agreements” 
with regard to the association of the AMS 
countries. 
In order to guarantee a uniform ap-
proach and to minimise the time and effort 
involved, one option would be the conclu-
sion of a framework Association Agree-
ment. Several enclosed protocols could ex-
plicitly cater to the particular specificities 
of all microstates. Such a framework Asso-
ciation Agreement could determine the 
institutional rules and provisions, which 
would then form the basis for future trea-
ties between the EU and the AMS countries. 
First and foremost, mechanisms and terms 
for the adoption of EU legislation would 
need to be determined. Furthermore, a 
monitoring authority for the implementa-
tion of new treaties and the arbitration of 
disputes would be required. The Court of 
Justice of the European Union could likely 
take on this role. 
AMS integration as a test run 
for other states 
Even though the last word has not been 
spoken, the message from Brussels is clear: 
More integration through association, but 
most likely no EU or EEA accession. From 
the perspective of the AMS countries, the 
quest for an appropriate association solu-
tion is not only an economic imperative, 
but also an important signal to their own 
citizens, who generally have a strong Euro-
pean identity and wish for preferential 
treatment compared to other third coun-
tries. 
Although the political and economic 
embedding of the AMS countries in the EU 
is advancing, the countries have not been 
given any powers of co-decision. Thus, they 
are increasingly becoming underprivileged, 
passive, quasi-members of the EU. For third 
countries that are willing and able to inte-
grate, the EU needs solutions beyond purely 
economic involvement – as provided by the 
EEA, for instance. 
In a broader context, Brussels needs to 
reflect on a number of conceptual consid-
erations: How to proceed with third coun-
tries whose participation in the single 
market is desired, but whose full accession 
is unrealistic? The expected commence-
ment of negotiations with the AMS coun-
tries could, in this respect, prove to be a 
model for the handling of candidates for 
independence such as Catalonia, the Faroe 
Islands, and Scotland. The stipulated prin-
ciples could then be applied to integration-
opposed states such as Switzerland, and 
even to current members wanting to with-
draw from the Union voluntarily. 
An association regime designed particu-
larly for the AMS countries could extend 
the spectrum of integration options of the 
EU in the long run, and might later serve 
as a promising alternative for other can-
didates. 
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